| Published on 01-09-2007 In National |
| Viewed 1664 times |
| Now Let us have a peaceful discourse on the Nuclear Deal |
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Written by Nilotpal Basu |
There is a thaw. The stand off between the Left parties and the UPA government has given way to a process of engagement on issues related to the nuclear agreement and its ramifications. Meanwhile, a discourse on the deal has been going on with rare intensity and viciousness. Of course, so far as the mainstream media is concerned, the Left has been targeted as the major stumbling block for the realization of a 'national dream' of becoming 'global power' in 'partnership' with the only superpower of the present times- the US.
In the current environment, the Left critique to the nuclear deal and its larger strategic ramification is being considered a 'nuisance' and the Left's refusal to accept the Government's paradigm as 'blackmail'. And predictably this discourse degenerated to the level of charging the Left of betraying Indian aspirations to help China and Pakistan.
Fortunately, with the decision of the Government to create a joint mechanism to go into the concerns of the Left and to proceed further only after taking into account the recommendations of the mechanism there will be some let up. The mechanism will go into the questions of possible impact of the Hyde Act on the 123 agreement, foreign policy, national security and question of security cooperation. This is precisely what the Left had asked for. That, in spite of this atmosphere of aggressive gunning for 'Left blood', the Government's announcement should come as a relief to those who believe in a more sober and balanced appraisal of issues facing the countries future. At this point in time, the exercise to find out as to who has climbed down will be the most unfortunate proposition. Nobody should try to look for 'victories' and 'defeats'. In what happened – they are no victors or vanquished.
This is extremely necessary to examine important policy implications of the deal for the future. The Left critique raised certain fundamental questions. The first question was whether the deal could be seen in isolation from the overall process of proximity between India and US developing into a full-fledged strategic partnership? The obvious issue that emerged – whether such a strategic partnership is in the best national interest – or are there other options available to the country? Whether the deal was not tying down India's foreign policy choices? Having recognized that energy and energy security is a very vital concern of the nation, whether the road map proposed to justify the deal was indeed the most appropriate for the country?
All these questions may not produce agreed answers all across the political spectrum. But can Indian democracy with its size and diversity afford to sidestep these questions. Can unilateral movement towards the operationalisation of the deal be in keeping with the requirements of a polity, which is divided, and more importantly is producing coalition governments, which are often in the minority? The nature and the issues of stand off are not only important for future policy course of the country but has major implications for the future polity. The stand off highlighted that non-adherence to an agreed Common Minimum Programme is the surest recipe to create avoidable strain.
The present announcement of the government perhaps recognizes this.
The strategic and international relations in a post Cold War landscape has thrown up important challenges. The bipolar world is bygone – there is no Soviet block, no Warsaw Pact. The ideal outcome should have been a multipolar world. But that it is not a natural course of development, but one, which is artificially sustained through unilateral hegemonistic intentions. Not only is the NATO continuing as a reminder of the Cold War, but also is sought to be replicated in other regions of the world. Can India's interest be served by getting co-opted in these hegemonistic ambition or its interest be better served by having a relationship of friendship and cooperation with everybody and particularly its neighbors? In the enthusiasm to isolate the Left, can mainstream India afford to fritter away the efforts initiated by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to improve our relations with China by being part of a naval exercise which conjures up the spectre of an Asian chapter of NATO.
Energy is crucial in the present global relations. For India also, it is vital, given the imperatives of a growing economy. But can nuclear energy be the panacea for all our energy requirements. With Thorium deposits, which constitute 24% of the global deposits, unless we reach the completion of our three stage development programmes, completing the fuel cycle, India will have to remain dependant for its fuel. With the possibility of an increment from 3% to 7% of its total generation in 15 years, that too, depending on external sources, the importance of nuclear energy cannot be blown out of proportions. Therefore, we cannot avoid evolving through a balanced discourse, the right energy mix and an appropriate energy policy. We have to look for all sources of energy including gas and oil.
Here the question of an independent foreign policy assumes great significance. Given the present volatility in Middle East and West Asia, with Iraq serving as the worst signpost of US policy, India's intention to partner them to spread 'freedom and democracy' can prove to be disastrous. It can only undermine our options. Isolating Iran in cahoots with US can be most counterproductive in our quest for oil and gas resources. A uni-dimensional strategic and foreign policy partnership with US can also upset our initiatives in Central Asia with the possible repercussions that such partnership may generate with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
The nuclear agreement itself exposes India to the possibility of future pressures of disruption by having linked 123 agreement's future implementation subjected to the Hyde Act. Such pressures could result in far deadly embrace of strategic partnership. The strategic dimension could also incalculably damage our neighborhood policy in South Asia.
These are issues, which go far beyond the conflict between the government and the Left. These are of immense significance for the future of the nation. We have missed an opportunity of having a lively and decent debate on them during the three weeks of the stand off. Let us not squander this new possibility for having a discourse, while the joint mechanism addresses its terms of reference. |
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