| Published on 17-12-2006 In World | | Viewed 1418 times | | THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ANTON |
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| Written by
K.Venkataramanan | 
One man's death seldom affects affairs of the state. Not only does life go on, but processes, both of peace and war, will continue. However, there are odd exceptions. Like Anton Stanislaus Balasingham.
His death came almost as a relief to the 68-year-old man who was fighting renal failure, chronic diabetes and a recently diagnosed malignant cancer of the bile duct. Some external observers may deem it a piece of bad news for peace in Sri Lanka. Tamils of the tragedy-beset island may mourn the loss of the foremost articulator of their political aspirations and diurnal grievances. Sinhalese nationalists may now begin to expect that the death of the man they often considered the real brain behind Tamil separatism may have weakened the movement.
None can gainsay that Balasingham's absence means the loss of a key moderating influence on a conflict that has almost gone irredeemably beyond the control of both the principal actors and a seemingly powerless international community. It has often been noted that whenever Balasingham was in control of the peace process, talks took place, violence declined and the normally obdurate Tiger leadership let itself be engaged by peace facilitators, government politicians or negotiators, and the international community.
And whenever he appeared to be sidelined, it has been noted, there was a violent escalation of the conflict and all prospects of peace seemed lost. Of course, it is a matter of conjecture as to when, if at all, he was really sidelined within the organisation, and when he was influencing its decisions and actions.
Whatever influence one may credit him with on the affairs of the Tigers, his death came at a time when his skills and reputation as a peace negotiator were useless, for the clouds of war are hanging low over the island, and his only contribution could have been as a political apologist and polemicist on their behalf. As the LTTE intensifies its 'struggle for independence', it needs military planners, commanders and suicide bombers more than negotiators, ideologues and advisers.
However, this does not mean that his death can be dismissed as a piece of irrelevance. The protracted conflict will ultimately have to be decided by a political process of negotiation, and his willingness to look at alternatives to a separate Tamil Eelam will be sorely missed at that point of time.
Again, this is not to say that he did not share the LTTE's ultimate objective of a separate State. He must have been one of the principal minds behind the LTTE strategy of entering negotiations with the sole aim of exposing the 'Sinhalese State' at the negotiating table as an adamant and supremacist entity that will concede nothing to the Tigers. This position itself is articulated in Pirabhakaran's Great Heroes' Day address of November 27, 2005, one of the many speeches written for him by Balasingham.
Yet, if and when talks on a political solution are to take place, and the international community places sufficient pressure on the Tiger leadership, Balasingham would have been the first to understand that rejecting alternatives to separatism would spell disaster for the organisation itself. It was thus that in December 2002 in Oslo, the government and the LTTE could agree to explore the possibility of a federal solution based on the principle of 'internal self-determination'. Some have said Pirabhakaran considered this too much of a concession by Balasingham and was unhappy with his negotiator. As far as Colombo was concerned, the use of the term 'internal self-determination' was a victory in itself. It did not take the Tigers long to repudiate the Oslo decision by claming later that it was not an 'agreement or a declaration' of the sort that would bind them.
It must be clearly understood that Balasingham seldom claimed to be a decision-maker for the Tamil Tigers.
He did refer to himself as its 'ideologue' and 'political adviser', but never has he said, or been accused of, contributing to key decisions like military offensives or political assassinations. His role, one could discern, lay in vindicating, post facto, any deed or misdeed of the organisation, explaining and elucidating the real or imaginary logic behind the LTTE's activities and, of course, expatiating relentlessly on the sufferings of the Tamil race in Sri Lanka and the supposed inflexibility of the Sinhalese. It was because he often gave vent to Tamil grievances and articulated Tamil aspirations in terms of a part mythical, part historical conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils that Pirabhakaran posthumously conferred on him the title 'Voice of the Nation'.
Balasingham had been in the forefront of all peace talks since India's abortive attempt to find a solution in Thimpu in 1985, and enjoyed a personal rapport with international interlocutors like Erik Solheim. And he was the one to whom the Norwegians went in London whenever they needed to give a push to their peace efforts.
Balasingham was an unabashed proponent of the Tiger view that Tamils who cooperated with the government were 'traitors', and that the LTTE was the 'sole representative' of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. He epitomized the organisation's Janus-faced attitude of professing peace and practicing terror. He appeared to woo India, but also actively despised it as the main impediment to 'Tamil Eelam'. He presented himself as a political liberal, but did not believe other parties had a role in Tamil areas of the country.
The most positive contribution that Balasingham made to peace in recent years were in framing the ceasefire agreement signed in February 2002 (that its terms were loaded in favour of the Tigers is another matter) and in giving a kick start to the talks in September that year. The LTTE's stand up to August was that they would not talk until the CFA was 'fully implemented', but Balasingham saw the futility of sticking to this position in the face of periodical statistics being released by the Nordic monitors about the innumerable ceasefire violations by the LTTE.
At the same time, Balasingham cannot escape responsibility for the Tamil Tigers leaving the talks in April 2003, even if it can be said that the leadership decides such things. Balasingham accused the Ranil Wickremesinghe regime of trying to ensnare the Tigers in an 'international safety net' and doing nothing to prevent their isolation from the world stage. Having been the 'moderate' and political face of the LTTE for years before the international community, it was pathetic to see Balasingham attack the rest of the world for trying to gang up against the LTTE, thereby inviting a fresh round of global isolation for the outfit.
Now I have to remind myself of the Latin maxim De mortuis nihil nisi bonum (Speak not ill of the dead) and move on to his other virtues. Balasingham's memory and experience provided some much-needed continuity to peace efforts, which come and go in fits and starts in Sri Lanka. And his knowledge and understanding of geopolitical realities ensured that the political content of the campaign for Tamil rights in Sri Lanka remained undiluted by his own organisation's repeated resort to terror strikes and assassinations.
He was a rarity in the Tamil Tiger hierarchy in that he appeared to have the respect of its absolutist leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran, and sometimes his ear too. With his death, the LTTE has a greater responsibility to ensure that it is better understood, for it no more has recourse to the lucidity and conviction with which its foremost spokesman could communicate with the world. And his exclusive ability to play its spin doctor in trying times.
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