Hope is a touchingly human weapon in conflict management. When let down by the reality of war, out comes this feckless tool from the sheath of optimism that the world wears around its waist, even while the parties to the conflict wear their warring hearts on their bloodied sleeves.

With somewhat embarrassing optimism, the 'international community' last week announced the resumption of stalled talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers and, carried away by the hope peddled by a Norwegian interlocutor, decreed that talks should begin in the first week of October in Oslo. And these talks would be 'unconditional', said the European Union, United States, Norway and Japan in a joint statement.

Fat chance! The parties will see to it that these talks, if they take place at all, would be linked to a series of conditions, some of them tenable, most unlikely to be so. And the conditions would be so onerous in tenor and substance that the parties may as well not go to Oslo to talk peace at all.

The three countries and the European grouping mentioned above constitute 'the international community' as far as Sri Lanka is concerned, with an additional position permanently kept open for India to walk into.

The four entities met in Brussels on September 12 to take stock of the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka and suggest measures to break the deadlock in the Norway-facilitated peace process. Norwegian Minister for International Development Erik Solheim apparently briefed the 'co-chairs' that both parties were ready for 'unconditional talks', leading to the group saying in a joint statement that '(T)he meeting should take place urgently in Oslo at the beginning of October, to be agreed to by the Parties. The Co-Chairs will meet at the end of October to review progress of the talks.'

It is not clear if the statement uses 'should' as a recommendation or an obligation. And the clause 'to be agreed to by the Parties' is even less clear as to what it leaves open to a future agreement between the parties. Is it the meeting itself, or the date and venue? One thing is certain: the 'Co-chairs will meet at the end of October to review the progress of the talks', but what if there are no talks?

The government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) protested that the Co-chairs had announced the talks without consulting it. And no one told them that the government had no conditions. The government wants the LTTE to stop all attacks and the international community to put in place a practical mechanism to ensure that the Tigers do not acquire fresh military supplies or in any other way enhance their military capability under the cover of the ceasefire.

And in its reaction, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam chose to focus on the rest of the Co-chairs' statement that urged the GoSL to abide by the 2002 ceasefire agreement and the pledges made at an earlier meeting between the parties in Geneva last February. LTTE political wing leader S.P. Thamilchelvan said the international community should ensure that Colombo took concrete steps to create an atmosphere conducive for talks. In other words, the Tigers had their own pre-conditions.

1. What are the immediate impediments to the commencement of peace talks? The following is an illustrative list, but one can trust the parties to come out with more imaginative preconditions if they do not want talks:
   The government may insist on a concrete commitment from the LTTE leadership that there will be no further attacks on security forces and on other targets, including political and public figures in Colombo.

   
   

   
   
   

   
   
2. The government may want a commitment from the Tigers that ships carrying soldiers, policemen and supplies from Trincomalee in the east to Kankesanturai in the north will not come under attack by the Sea Tigers.
3. Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, known to be a Sinhalese hardliner, has added his own condition to the effect that the LTTE should lay down arms before talks could be begun. It is highly unlikely that the government shares this view, but it may capture the imagination of hawks in Colombo who do not want peace talks to take place at a time when the Tigers seem to be losing.
4. The LTTE may insist that the armed forces vacate Sampur, a small town in Trincomalee district captured by the Army from the Tigers recently, as it contends that such territorial expansion is barred by the CFA. If the Tigers are insistent on this as a precondition, the talks are unlikely to materialize.
5. The LTTE wants a halt to all unexplained killings, abductions and disappearances taking place in the north-east, as well as in parts of Colombo, with Tamils being the victims in both cases.

Disarming the breakaway Karuna faction is another possible precondition from the Tiger side. The Co-chairs' reminder to the government about the 'pledges made in Geneva' is a shot in the arm for the LTTE, as the GOSL agreed in Geneva that it would not allow armed groups to function in areas under its control. However, this is another potential deal-breaker, if put forward as a precondition.

If beyond all these hurdles, the parties do agree to meet in Oslo, or elsewhere, in October, or in any other month, it will be under tremendous international pressure, and not because they want it. And they may end up, as they did in February in Geneva, indulging in mutual recriminations and winding up the session with some promises they have no intention of honouring. The aftermath of such a fruitless session can only be a more aggressive and brutal phase of war. Even though the LTTE came out second best in the last few battles, especially at Maavilaru, Mutur and Sampur in the east, and failed in its bid to make inroads into government territory in the Jaffna peninsula and adjacent islands, the deadly guerrilla outfit cannot be written off. It may be reserving its firepower and manpower for a fresh offensive after October when the rains break out. The Tigers find the frequent use of airpower by the GOSL a bit too difficult to handle, and they may be waiting for weather conditions that render flying of combat jets difficult. And they always retain the option of carrying out a bombing or assassination in Colombo Peace talks in Sri Lanka in the past have been nothing but interludes of calm in the midst of a seemingly unending war. After more than four years of cessation of hostilities, there has been a minor change. Raging battles are now seen as interludes of hostilities in the midst of truce. Both parties involved in the conflict still claim they are committed to the February 2006 agreement, and that they are prepared for talks. However, the essential truth remains that the government and the rebels are nowhere near a peace agreement.